Post date: Mon, Apr 13, 2026
Category: global order
By: Jackline Kagume,

The reference to “a just global order” is increasingly prevalent in global policy discussions, but often with little clarity on what it entails in practice. The idea seems to carry moral weight and political appeal but remains largely unexamined for what it would actually take to operationalise it. Fundamentally, a just global order is not simply a matter of institutional design or principles, but rather a financing question.

This is not to diminish the importance of rules and norms, or multilateral cooperation. A rules based international system premised on the United Nations Charter and sustained through international financial institutions and the World Trade Organization, is indispensable. However, rules without resources cannot deliver development outcomes. Justice, in material terms, depends on how capital is generated, distributed, and deployed across the global economy.

The current global financing architecture reveals a persistent contradiction. On the one hand, there is broad consensus on development objectives including the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), that suggest a shared commitment to eradicate poverty, reduce inequality, and promote sustainable growth. On the other hand, progress toward these goals is substantially inadequate. A recent United Nations assessment indicates that only 35 per cent of SDG targets are on track or making moderate progress. Nearly half have recorded weak and insufficient progress, and alarmingly, 18 per cent are in reverse.

This predicament is neither due to a lack of evidence on effective policy interventions, nor to a shortage of global financial resources. Rather, it’s indicative of a structural failure in how development financing is organised. In many developing countries, the prevailing model of development finance is heavily reliant on debt instruments. Across Sub-Saharan Africa for instance, external financing is predominantly accessed through loans, that are often denominated in foreign currencies. This creates a dual burden where Governments must finance development while simultaneously managing debt sustainability and exchange rate risk. From an economic lens, this model is problematic as it requires long term capital that can support public investment in infrastructure, health, education, and productive sectors. In contrast, financing that is structured primarily as debt with relatively short repayment periods and exposure to currency volatility, constrains fiscal space and reduces the scope for productive public investment.

The imbalance is equally evident from a legal perspective. International law recognises, at least in principle, the notion of differentiated responsibilities. In the climate context, the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities acknowledges that countries have contributed unequally to global challenges and possess different capacities to address them. Financing arrangements however often fail to reflect this principle in practice. A good example is the support for climate transitions which is frequently extended through loans rather than grants, effectively shifting the burden onto the very countries that are least responsible for the problem.

Recent shifts in global economic policy suggest that this imbalance may become more pronounced. The United States’ Fiscal Year 2027 budget proposal signals a deliberate retreat from elements of multilateral engagement and development financing. It emphasises reductions in non-defence spending and proposes the scaling back or elimination of several foreign assistance programmes, and frames such cuts as a necessary correction to what is perceived as inefficient or disproportionate global spending.

 

This posture is not entirely new. It demonstrates a long-standing tension within the international system regarding burden-sharing and the extent to which advanced economies should finance development beyond their borders. The argument that the United States has historically carried a disproportionate share of global development financing can be politically persuasive within the U.S., particularly in periods of fiscal constraint and rising geopolitical competition.

However, while politically compelling, this inward turn carries significant long-term risks. A retreat from multilateral financing does not eliminate global challenges. It redistributes and, in many cases, intensifies them. Development deficits, climate vulnerability, and economic instability are not contained within national borders but rather transmitted across regions through migration pressures, trade disruptions, and financial instability spillovers. In this sense, underinvestment in global public goods is not a saving but a deferred cost.

Recent tensions in the Middle East driven by the escalation of conflict involving Iran, serve as a reminder that global stability is indivisible. The effects of the conflict illustrate that economic and security shocks spread rapidly across borders, with adverse and often indiscriminate consequences for energy markets, inflation, and disruptions in trade. In this environment, a withdrawal from multilateral engagement escalates exposure to the risks it seeks to avoid.  A just global order therefore cannot be sustained through unilateral withdrawal. It requires sustained commitment to collective financing mechanisms that recognise interdependence and shared interest premised on mutual stability.

At the same time, it would be incomplete to locate the responsibility for this imbalance solely within advanced economies. The pursuit of a more equitable global order must also confront governance and accountability challenges within developing countries themselves. In many cases, weak public financial management systems and inefficiencies in expenditure undermine the effective use of domestic and external financing significantly.

For countries across Sub-Saharan Africa, including Kenya, this presents a twofold responsibility. On the one hand, there is a legitimate case for reforming the global financing architecture to better reflect principles of equity and differentiated responsibility. On the other hand, there is an equally urgent need to strengthen domestic fiscal governance, enhance transparency in debt management, and improve the efficiency of public spending. This is a necessary condition for credibility. A claim to a “just global order” carries greater weight when it is accompanied by demonstrable efforts to manage resources responsibly and to align public finance with development outcomes.

In practical terms, this requires three things. First, strengthening democratic institutions responsible for fiscal oversight to ensure transparency, accountability, and disciplined management of public resources. Second, ensuring that borrowed resources are directed toward productive investment to generate sustainable economic returns and reduce future fiscal pressures. Third, adopting a more deliberate approach to external financing, including greater scrutiny of debt conditions and long-term sustainability.

In the end, the question of a just global order is about how responsibility is shared and structured. A system that relies on diminishing external support without strengthening domestic accountability will fail. Equally, a system that demands domestic reform without addressing structural inequities in global financing will bear the long term effects. The lasting solution lies in recognising that justice in the global economy is achieved through aligned incentives and financing arrangements that reflect both fairness and responsibility.

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