It is not clear whether there will be any more stark evidence of the tenure of the Jubilee administration and its obsession with brick-and-mortar acquisitions, than two conspicuous pieces of infrastructure. One is situated in Nairobi while the other is the Standard Gauge Railway from Mombasa and both are capital-intensive transport projects. The latter terminates at the Railway Station in Nairobi, with its endangered extension in Naivasha.
A shared attribute is that both are insanely expensive pieces of infrastructure forming the signature and glaring talismans of the Jubilee administration. They talked up both and parliament was persuaded to allocate enormous sums of money to fund construction in the belief that this pair of investments, among others, would elevate Kenya’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) towards “double-digit growth”. Phrase-mongering, as the substitute for policy explanation, ought to have alerted careful citizens that the leadership of Jubilee as cowboys of infrastructure construction, were, really “all hat and no cattle”.
There will be sufficient time to evaluate the overall costs of this pair of infrastructure investments, though one can still render the early and dispassionate view that this choice of expenditure will neither vindicate Jubilee administration’s management, nor justify its policy priorities. That notwithstanding, alert Kenyans are enquiring whether the Nairobi Expressway represents value for money and whether it will accomplish the goals of reducing road congestion in Nairobi in a cost effective way.
This blog post doesn’t intend to provide a comparison between the SGR and the Nairobi Expressway. Instead, the purpose is to highlight shared attributes that are red flags for White Elephants economics and then examine the Nairobi Expressway’s prospects against the 27-year concession period. The first question is, “What are some shared attributes of the Kenya’s SGR and The Nairobi Expressway?”
The SGR in History
As declared to Kenya’s parliament in this report, the nominal cost of the first phase of the Standard Gauge Railway was US$ 3.821 billion when construction commenced in 2015. This phase of SGR represented the early season of the Jubilee administration’s reign and was immensely popular owing to the belief that the old railway truck was irreparably damaged and needed urgent replacement. This point was amplified with the canard that the SGR technology was a new and superior form of railways technology. Forgotten in this hubris was that investment in any single track railway line that costs nearly $6.6 million per kilometre is by all means excessive, even if this cost includes the purchase of some engines too. Construction cost benchmarks for a single track of high speed railway line is estimated as being in the range of $0.9 to $ 1.2 million per kilometre, suggesting that the agreed construction costwas already well above commercially sensible levels, even after taking the costs of equipment into account.
The incomplete disclosure of the terms of the loans used to finance the railway line make it difficult to assess the cost to taxpayers but it is clear that this is a project for which the value for money and prudence in expenditure remain indefensible.
The Nairobi Expressway
Towards the tail end of the Jubilee administration’s tenure, president Uhuru Kenyatta demonstrated singular commitment to completion of the 27.1 kilometres highway leading from the Jomo Kenyatta International Airport and running right through the Central Business District before terminating in the Westlands district in Nairobi.
The contention about the Nairobi Expressway comes in two main forms. The first is the perception that this road was built to provide comfortable travel to higher income riders and therefore is a policy guided by a discriminatory intent, while the second is the claim that the construction, maintenance and the management costs of the Nairobi Expressway are inflated and represent public giveaways to the private firms and lenders and concession holders in the Public Private Partnership (PPP).
While the media refers to this road as the Nairobi“Superhighway”, it was conceived as a 27.1 kilometre alternative to the main highway from the Mlolongo through the city centre. A primary advantage of its use is that it affords motorists an alternative and faster path from the Mlolongo, the Jomo Kenyatta International Airport (JKIA) towards the centre of the city and out of it, terminating in Westlands in exchange for direct payment of a toll fee.
Formally known as the Nairobi Expressway, this road was officially opened in June 2022. It is a tolled road with an end to end payment of Kshs. 360 for the end to end trip, working out to about Kshs 13.28 per kilometre for a class 3 vehicle. As illustrated by Table 1 below, the applicable rates vary by vehicle size and passenger numbers and range from Kshs 360 (x) for the full journey for Class 3, classified as a light vehicle with two axles to 5 times the rate (x) for a vehicle with four or more axles.
The construction cost of the Nairobi Expressway has risen in the last 3 years from a planning estimate of Kshs. 16 Billion for a lower scale project, to Kshs. 87.9 billion in the first half of 2022.Similar to the SGR, the Nairobi Expressway is not only the most expensive road constructed in Kenya on a kilometre basis, but possibly among comparable ones in the world. Let’s consider the declared cost numbers.
With measured length of 27.1 kilometres from one end to the other, it is a complex construction because it is elevated for about 8.5 kilometres of that length and also consists of six lanes for half the distance and four lanes for the rest. Some of the public discourse carries the assumption that the initial Kshs. 88 billion cost of construction was pre-financed by public money. The total construction was undertaken by a contracted firm, the China Roads and Bridges and Corporation (CRBC) while the funding for its construction was provided by the China Communications Construction Company (CCCC).
The Government of Kenya has contributed various sums that are indirectly related to construction costs. These include compensation for land acquisition, transferring of utilities and resettlement and, the relocation of municipal pipelines and restoration of damaged infrastructure incidental to the construction. Based on declarations by the treasury, an additional Kshs. 24.8 billion was spent for these purposes. All these were intended to enable the construction to commence and accommodate alterations that became necessary.
The reportage on the construction and total costs of the road have lacked accuracy because the crude measurement has simply divided the declared total cost to the length of the road. This approach has led to the declaration that the Nairobi Expressway was constructed at a cost equivalent to US$ 29.5 million per kilometre. This is inaccurate, bearing in mind that this road is a six lane track for half the distance and 4-way lane for the rest, the cost calculation ought to be carefully accounted for the total surface area created for vehicle use.
As stated in project documents, the Nairobi Expressway is split in equal distances between a six lane and 4 lane highway. Accurate calculation of the cost of construction for each kilometre requires acknowledgement of the fact that this a multi-lane road. Thus six lanes for 13.55 kilometres mean that the length of the surface constructed is 81.3 kilometres while the four lanes covering another 13.55 kilometres comes to an additional 54.2 kilometres surface. Together, this means that the track surface length for the Nairobi Expressway comes to Kshs. 649.45 million per kilometre for each lane. This is a sensible estimate of the average cost built upon the safe assumption that the costs of elevation and dualling are distributed evenly across the entire surface. Based on comparable figures for roads construction in Kenya published by a contractor firm here, it is still clear that the costs per kilometre for the superhighway remain the highest in Kenya.
A missing part of the cost computation is the opportunity costs in terms of the tax exemptions on imported materials, VAT and crucially, the exemption of withholding tax on dividends that would be paid to the commercial beneficiaries of the concession. These terms of the agreement between government of Kenya and the concessionaire are declared in generalities but details of clauses in the PPP remain undisclosed. They carry hidden costs and if they were accurately stated, then they would add to the total cost of the project separate from the Kshs. 88 billion which is stated as the direct costs of construction. and the compensation for land acquisition and diversion of municipal infrastructure.
Understandably, the public conversation has been affected by the limited disclosure on all terms of both the SGR and the Nairobi Expressway. This tendency to initiate grand projects with ostensible transformational effects while providing limited information was among the Jubilee administration’s strongest demeanours. As a result, there is sensible question that arises. Why has government of Kenya introduced tolling policy on this undeniably costly road while the public already paid for its construction?
Why is a Toll Road Different from a Regular Highway?
The republic of Kenya bears liability for the loan to the funder, meaning that there is a claim on public revenues related to this construction and supported by the privileged place of public debt as a first charge in the constitution. The concession holder is a Chinese firm licensed to operate the toll road and collect revenues to be deposited into a fund. In turn, the deposits in this fund would be used to redeem the costs of both construction and maintenance for a period of 27 years. While this celebrated PPP transaction is characterised as a Build Own Operate and Transfer (BOOT), the nature of the funding and repayment arrangement suggests that the all financial risks for this project are borne by the government of Kenya. Guarantees by the government of Kenya mean that risks related to insufficient demand, adverse foreign exchange adjustments and all maintenance costs have no bearing on the profitability expectations for the concession holder. This is a shared attribute to the SGR too in spite of the inadequate disclosures for both contracts.
A reflection of the lack of transparency and the frequent changes of the costs and dimensions of Nairobi Expressway is the fact that the estimates of the vehicles required to meet the cost of repayment is projected to grow from about 950 to 2300 per hour during the 27-year concession period. This toll road is constructed parallel to the Mombasa to Nairobi Highway and therefore is a substitute to that highway for that length. Its logic is to reduce the traffic congestion for travellers by providing an alternative through the most congested portion of the older highway. Considering that the peak hour congestion on that stretch can last for up to an hour, the Nairobi Expressway provides the option for a traveller to take the faster route for the same distance and thereby save time. In exchange for this convenience of saved time, the motorist pays the toll fees which is used for road maintenance, redemption of the debt obligation borne by government and also for the profit that will accrue to the concession holder. Unlike the road that runs parallel to the Nairobi Expressway, one pays for the use of that road in addition to the indirect taxation through the fuel levy.
In basic economics reasoning, the choice of travel on the tolled road is based on the value of time and motorist’s preference for shortening the time, in exchange for payment of the toll charge. Bear in mind that the Nairobi Expressway runs parallel to the main highway from Mombasa to Nairobi and therefore is a competing road for the distance from Mlolongo to Westlands. Thus its real value as a substitute is that it enables the choice of two routes for travellers for nearly similar length of road, with the exception that the toll road imposes a payment option. This conditions means that the motorist has a wider choice and pays for that choice through more time on the regular road and bears a financial cost on the Nairobi Expressway. This condition makes it difficult to think that there is predetermined discrimination against one or the other.
Are Both White Elephants?
A White Elephant is a project of any size which cannot justify the resources spent to accomplish it. In other words, this would be project with negative social value, even though it may generate a surplus for one party in a transaction.
The status of the Standard Gauge Railway from Mombasa to Nairobi as a White Elephant project is not in doubt, being that the prospects for its paying its costs from operational surpluses is highly unlikely. The Nairobi Expressway has a strong commercial appeal and its utility value for private motorists is observable. Toll fees could be adjusted upwards as demand rises and thereby raise the revenues to raise the viability of the project, the hidden costs, tax waivers, guarantees and the fact that land compensation costs that typically cost about up to half of total costs of a multilane highways projects mean that Kenya has discounted a very large part of the real costs.
The operations of the Nairobi Expressway assume a use rate that is very optimistic and their attainment through growth in traffic could yet yield fees sufficient to pay a substantial part of the costs of construction and yield a good profit for the concession holder. What is clear is that similar to the SGR project, this Nairobi Expressway’s construction costs and indirect costs have exceeded an amount that would make it an investment with positive social return. Sensible calculations on its viability have concentrated on the ability to pay for the engineering costs, implying that this project would secure a decent return within 27 years or less. Considering the opportunity costs of the entire project and the indirect costs stated above is the correct way to measure the returns beyond the focus on payment for the brick and mortar construction and its maintenance. On this comprehensive basis, there’s no doubt that this project has been too costly and would invariably become a White Elephant.
Both projects are lessons that an extreme obsession with single sourcing, added to optimistic and biased procurement that limits competition, project cost adjustments, a situation of zero risk borne by the concession holders and absolute reluctance to make open disclosure about direct and covert costs are great red flags to the probability that a public works project will become a White Elephant. Both the SGR and the Nairobi Expressway tick all these boxes too readily. Kenyan taxpayers will bear the costs while ensuring a virtually risk free and high return for the concession holders in both cases.
Key words: Infrastructure, White Elephants
In a Public-public-private partnership, the private partner typically assumes many responsibilities throughout the project life cycle. In a Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) model, the private entity is responsible for an infrastructure project’s design, construction, financing, and operation for a specific period. The private entity, called the concessionaire, operates the project and recovers construction costs through user fees, […]
This blog highlights IEA’s most recent work on taxation, a problem-driven political economy analysis of taxation.[i] After the study’s publication, a webinar was held to discuss the findings of the political economy analysis available here. [ii] In the introduction, the study outlines how Kenya’s tax policy faces challenges from its political ecosystem, structural factors, and […]
Case Adjournments is one of the key issues that contributes to case backlogs because it reduces the efficiency of courts. An adjournment in a legal setting involves pausing or temporally stopping ongoing proceedings to be continued at a later time, date, or location. It may also indicate the end of the day’s proceedings. Parties involved […]
Introduction In February 2023, the Kenyan government announced its intention to establish a framework that will enable Savings and Credit Cooperative Societies (SACCOs) to extend loans to each other. This inter-Sacco lending framework shall be set up by the Sacco Societies Regulatory Authority (SASRA) and was anticipated to be in effect from August 2023. This […]
While Kenya has long implemented the NHIF (National Hospital Insurance Fund) whose core mandate is to provide medical insurance coverage to all its members and their declared dependants and also to make medical care affordable, enrolment rates, particularly in the voluntary and informal sectors, remain low. Yet, NHIF is the most common type of health […]
Post date: Fri, Feb 3, 2023 |
Category: InfrastructureWhite Elephants |
By: Kwame Owino, |
It is not clear whether there will be any more stark evidence of the tenure of the Jubilee administration and its obsession with brick-and-mortar acquisitions, than two conspicuous pieces of infrastructure. One is situated in Nairobi while the other is the Standard Gauge Railway from Mombasa and both are capital-intensive transport projects. The latter terminates at the Railway Station in Nairobi, with its endangered extension in Naivasha.
A shared attribute is that both are insanely expensive pieces of infrastructure forming the signature and glaring talismans of the Jubilee administration. They talked up both and parliament was persuaded to allocate enormous sums of money to fund construction in the belief that this pair of investments, among others, would elevate Kenya’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) towards “double-digit growth”. Phrase-mongering, as the substitute for policy explanation, ought to have alerted careful citizens that the leadership of Jubilee as cowboys of infrastructure construction, were, really “all hat and no cattle”.
There will be sufficient time to evaluate the overall costs of this pair of infrastructure investments, though one can still render the early and dispassionate view that this choice of expenditure will neither vindicate Jubilee administration’s management, nor justify its policy priorities. That notwithstanding, alert Kenyans are enquiring whether the Nairobi Expressway represents value for money and whether it will accomplish the goals of reducing road congestion in Nairobi in a cost effective way.
This blog post doesn’t intend to provide a comparison between the SGR and the Nairobi Expressway. Instead, the purpose is to highlight shared attributes that are red flags for White Elephants economics and then examine the Nairobi Expressway’s prospects against the 27-year concession period. The first question is, “What are some shared attributes of the Kenya’s SGR and The Nairobi Expressway?”
The SGR in History
As declared to Kenya’s parliament in this report, the nominal cost of the first phase of the Standard Gauge Railway was US$ 3.821 billion when construction commenced in 2015. This phase of SGR represented the early season of the Jubilee administration’s reign and was immensely popular owing to the belief that the old railway truck was irreparably damaged and needed urgent replacement. This point was amplified with the canard that the SGR technology was a new and superior form of railways technology. Forgotten in this hubris was that investment in any single track railway line that costs nearly $6.6 million per kilometre is by all means excessive, even if this cost includes the purchase of some engines too. Construction cost benchmarks for a single track of high speed railway line is estimated as being in the range of $0.9 to $ 1.2 million per kilometre, suggesting that the agreed construction costwas already well above commercially sensible levels, even after taking the costs of equipment into account.
The incomplete disclosure of the terms of the loans used to finance the railway line make it difficult to assess the cost to taxpayers but it is clear that this is a project for which the value for money and prudence in expenditure remain indefensible.
The Nairobi Expressway
Towards the tail end of the Jubilee administration’s tenure, president Uhuru Kenyatta demonstrated singular commitment to completion of the 27.1 kilometres highway leading from the Jomo Kenyatta International Airport and running right through the Central Business District before terminating in the Westlands district in Nairobi.
The contention about the Nairobi Expressway comes in two main forms. The first is the perception that this road was built to provide comfortable travel to higher income riders and therefore is a policy guided by a discriminatory intent, while the second is the claim that the construction, maintenance and the management costs of the Nairobi Expressway are inflated and represent public giveaways to the private firms and lenders and concession holders in the Public Private Partnership (PPP).
While the media refers to this road as the Nairobi“Superhighway”, it was conceived as a 27.1 kilometre alternative to the main highway from the Mlolongo through the city centre. A primary advantage of its use is that it affords motorists an alternative and faster path from the Mlolongo, the Jomo Kenyatta International Airport (JKIA) towards the centre of the city and out of it, terminating in Westlands in exchange for direct payment of a toll fee.
Formally known as the Nairobi Expressway, this road was officially opened in June 2022. It is a tolled road with an end to end payment of Kshs. 360 for the end to end trip, working out to about Kshs 13.28 per kilometre for a class 3 vehicle. As illustrated by Table 1 below, the applicable rates vary by vehicle size and passenger numbers and range from Kshs 360 (x) for the full journey for Class 3, classified as a light vehicle with two axles to 5 times the rate (x) for a vehicle with four or more axles.
The construction cost of the Nairobi Expressway has risen in the last 3 years from a planning estimate of Kshs. 16 Billion for a lower scale project, to Kshs. 87.9 billion in the first half of 2022.Similar to the SGR, the Nairobi Expressway is not only the most expensive road constructed in Kenya on a kilometre basis, but possibly among comparable ones in the world. Let’s consider the declared cost numbers.
With measured length of 27.1 kilometres from one end to the other, it is a complex construction because it is elevated for about 8.5 kilometres of that length and also consists of six lanes for half the distance and four lanes for the rest. Some of the public discourse carries the assumption that the initial Kshs. 88 billion cost of construction was pre-financed by public money. The total construction was undertaken by a contracted firm, the China Roads and Bridges and Corporation (CRBC) while the funding for its construction was provided by the China Communications Construction Company (CCCC).
The Government of Kenya has contributed various sums that are indirectly related to construction costs. These include compensation for land acquisition, transferring of utilities and resettlement and, the relocation of municipal pipelines and restoration of damaged infrastructure incidental to the construction. Based on declarations by the treasury, an additional Kshs. 24.8 billion was spent for these purposes. All these were intended to enable the construction to commence and accommodate alterations that became necessary.
The reportage on the construction and total costs of the road have lacked accuracy because the crude measurement has simply divided the declared total cost to the length of the road. This approach has led to the declaration that the Nairobi Expressway was constructed at a cost equivalent to US$ 29.5 million per kilometre. This is inaccurate, bearing in mind that this road is a six lane track for half the distance and 4-way lane for the rest, the cost calculation ought to be carefully accounted for the total surface area created for vehicle use.
As stated in project documents, the Nairobi Expressway is split in equal distances between a six lane and 4 lane highway. Accurate calculation of the cost of construction for each kilometre requires acknowledgement of the fact that this a multi-lane road. Thus six lanes for 13.55 kilometres mean that the length of the surface constructed is 81.3 kilometres while the four lanes covering another 13.55 kilometres comes to an additional 54.2 kilometres surface. Together, this means that the track surface length for the Nairobi Expressway comes to Kshs. 649.45 million per kilometre for each lane. This is a sensible estimate of the average cost built upon the safe assumption that the costs of elevation and dualling are distributed evenly across the entire surface. Based on comparable figures for roads construction in Kenya published by a contractor firm here, it is still clear that the costs per kilometre for the superhighway remain the highest in Kenya.
A missing part of the cost computation is the opportunity costs in terms of the tax exemptions on imported materials, VAT and crucially, the exemption of withholding tax on dividends that would be paid to the commercial beneficiaries of the concession. These terms of the agreement between government of Kenya and the concessionaire are declared in generalities but details of clauses in the PPP remain undisclosed. They carry hidden costs and if they were accurately stated, then they would add to the total cost of the project separate from the Kshs. 88 billion which is stated as the direct costs of construction. and the compensation for land acquisition and diversion of municipal infrastructure.
Understandably, the public conversation has been affected by the limited disclosure on all terms of both the SGR and the Nairobi Expressway. This tendency to initiate grand projects with ostensible transformational effects while providing limited information was among the Jubilee administration’s strongest demeanours. As a result, there is sensible question that arises. Why has government of Kenya introduced tolling policy on this undeniably costly road while the public already paid for its construction?
Why is a Toll Road Different from a Regular Highway?
The republic of Kenya bears liability for the loan to the funder, meaning that there is a claim on public revenues related to this construction and supported by the privileged place of public debt as a first charge in the constitution. The concession holder is a Chinese firm licensed to operate the toll road and collect revenues to be deposited into a fund. In turn, the deposits in this fund would be used to redeem the costs of both construction and maintenance for a period of 27 years. While this celebrated PPP transaction is characterised as a Build Own Operate and Transfer (BOOT), the nature of the funding and repayment arrangement suggests that the all financial risks for this project are borne by the government of Kenya. Guarantees by the government of Kenya mean that risks related to insufficient demand, adverse foreign exchange adjustments and all maintenance costs have no bearing on the profitability expectations for the concession holder. This is a shared attribute to the SGR too in spite of the inadequate disclosures for both contracts.
A reflection of the lack of transparency and the frequent changes of the costs and dimensions of Nairobi Expressway is the fact that the estimates of the vehicles required to meet the cost of repayment is projected to grow from about 950 to 2300 per hour during the 27-year concession period. This toll road is constructed parallel to the Mombasa to Nairobi Highway and therefore is a substitute to that highway for that length. Its logic is to reduce the traffic congestion for travellers by providing an alternative through the most congested portion of the older highway. Considering that the peak hour congestion on that stretch can last for up to an hour, the Nairobi Expressway provides the option for a traveller to take the faster route for the same distance and thereby save time. In exchange for this convenience of saved time, the motorist pays the toll fees which is used for road maintenance, redemption of the debt obligation borne by government and also for the profit that will accrue to the concession holder. Unlike the road that runs parallel to the Nairobi Expressway, one pays for the use of that road in addition to the indirect taxation through the fuel levy.
In basic economics reasoning, the choice of travel on the tolled road is based on the value of time and motorist’s preference for shortening the time, in exchange for payment of the toll charge. Bear in mind that the Nairobi Expressway runs parallel to the main highway from Mombasa to Nairobi and therefore is a competing road for the distance from Mlolongo to Westlands. Thus its real value as a substitute is that it enables the choice of two routes for travellers for nearly similar length of road, with the exception that the toll road imposes a payment option. This conditions means that the motorist has a wider choice and pays for that choice through more time on the regular road and bears a financial cost on the Nairobi Expressway. This condition makes it difficult to think that there is predetermined discrimination against one or the other.
Are Both White Elephants?
A White Elephant is a project of any size which cannot justify the resources spent to accomplish it. In other words, this would be project with negative social value, even though it may generate a surplus for one party in a transaction.
The status of the Standard Gauge Railway from Mombasa to Nairobi as a White Elephant project is not in doubt, being that the prospects for its paying its costs from operational surpluses is highly unlikely. The Nairobi Expressway has a strong commercial appeal and its utility value for private motorists is observable. Toll fees could be adjusted upwards as demand rises and thereby raise the revenues to raise the viability of the project, the hidden costs, tax waivers, guarantees and the fact that land compensation costs that typically cost about up to half of total costs of a multilane highways projects mean that Kenya has discounted a very large part of the real costs.
The operations of the Nairobi Expressway assume a use rate that is very optimistic and their attainment through growth in traffic could yet yield fees sufficient to pay a substantial part of the costs of construction and yield a good profit for the concession holder. What is clear is that similar to the SGR project, this Nairobi Expressway’s construction costs and indirect costs have exceeded an amount that would make it an investment with positive social return. Sensible calculations on its viability have concentrated on the ability to pay for the engineering costs, implying that this project would secure a decent return within 27 years or less. Considering the opportunity costs of the entire project and the indirect costs stated above is the correct way to measure the returns beyond the focus on payment for the brick and mortar construction and its maintenance. On this comprehensive basis, there’s no doubt that this project has been too costly and would invariably become a White Elephant.
Both projects are lessons that an extreme obsession with single sourcing, added to optimistic and biased procurement that limits competition, project cost adjustments, a situation of zero risk borne by the concession holders and absolute reluctance to make open disclosure about direct and covert costs are great red flags to the probability that a public works project will become a White Elephant. Both the SGR and the Nairobi Expressway tick all these boxes too readily. Kenyan taxpayers will bear the costs while ensuring a virtually risk free and high return for the concession holders in both cases.
Key words: Infrastructure, White Elephants
In a Public-public-private partnership, the private partner typically assumes many responsibilities throughout the project life cycle. In a Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) model, the private entity is responsible for an infrastructure project’s design, construction, financing, and operation for a specific period. The private entity, called the concessionaire, operates the project and recovers construction costs through user fees, […]
This blog highlights IEA’s most recent work on taxation, a problem-driven political economy analysis of taxation.[i] After the study’s publication, a webinar was held to discuss the findings of the political economy analysis available here. [ii] In the introduction, the study outlines how Kenya’s tax policy faces challenges from its political ecosystem, structural factors, and […]
Case Adjournments is one of the key issues that contributes to case backlogs because it reduces the efficiency of courts. An adjournment in a legal setting involves pausing or temporally stopping ongoing proceedings to be continued at a later time, date, or location. It may also indicate the end of the day’s proceedings. Parties involved […]
Introduction In February 2023, the Kenyan government announced its intention to establish a framework that will enable Savings and Credit Cooperative Societies (SACCOs) to extend loans to each other. This inter-Sacco lending framework shall be set up by the Sacco Societies Regulatory Authority (SASRA) and was anticipated to be in effect from August 2023. This […]
While Kenya has long implemented the NHIF (National Hospital Insurance Fund) whose core mandate is to provide medical insurance coverage to all its members and their declared dependants and also to make medical care affordable, enrolment rates, particularly in the voluntary and informal sectors, remain low. Yet, NHIF is the most common type of health […]